Nothing captures the absurdity of the debate around Syria better than an exchange yesterday on BBC Radio 4’s flagship Today program. Veteran broadcaster John Humphrys was interviewing Syrian expat Rim Turkmani, who is opposed to any form of military intervention. “But what if it was your family in Homs?” Humphrys probed. “I have family in Homs. At least a dozen,” Tukmani replied. “I’m terrified for them, but intervention will only increase the bloodshed.” At which point the interview lost its easy structure.
True, Humphrys was playing advocatus diaboli, but he was a lot less diaboli to the other guest, a Syrian advocating Western arming of the Free Syrian Army. Why? Because he fitted the now tiresome narrative — beleaguered people crying out for help, spurned by the West. Yet Tukmani made clear the full absurdity of the situation, in that no one is seriously contemplating any sort of full-scale Western military intervention in Syria — whatever is going to happen will depend on what Turkey wants to do.
So the debate about it has become entirely virtual — it is now an occasion for the wringing of hands, and the abstract discussion of moral obligations that no one proposes acting on. And just in case attentive readers are wondering how your correspondent can say this having supported Western involvement in Libya — it’s the very difference of the situations that suggest when one should and shouldn’t support involvement.
Libya was a revolution by the Libyan people across the board — whatever the shadowy nature of the leadership — against an autocrat with no social base to speak of, merely mercenaries and weapons. We assisted a process they had begun themselves in a clear manifestation of the general will, and in a military situation where strategic assistance was limitable and feasible.
Syria has several separate peoples penned within a colonial-era boundary. The uprising is partial, ethno-religiously based, and does not appear to have general or national consent. Assad’s brutality in Homs and elsewhere is indefensible, and it is possible that Turkey will wave a stick as part of negotiating a political solution. Anything else, would be attending to the horror of witnessing the killing of Homs, rather than doing what is possible to stop the killing itself.
That division — between our own needs and those of the actual Syrian people — is no better illustrated than by the treatment of the death of Marie Colvin, the veteran war correspondent, who was killed (with a young French photographer) in Homs two days ago. Colvin was famous as a three-decade veteran of dangerous war assignments, and became iconic, due to the adoption of a black patch, to cover an eye lost in the line of fire. She stayed in Homs, after her editor urged her to get out to get “one more story”, and appears to have been directly targeted by the Syrian government. Her death has dominated the news for a full 36 hours, with the always added subscript that “we should not forget ordinary Syrians are dying in large numbers”.
Amidst all this, no one has really asked whether her death, or her extended mission, had any real purpose. By the day she died, Colvin had already filed a long piece in The Sunday Times about the effects of the shelling on Homs, and added this comment to the BBC, which has gone round the world:
“I watched a little baby die today,” Marie Colvin told the BBC from the embattled city of Homs on Tuesday in one of her final reports.
“Absolutely horrific, a two-year old child had been hit … They stripped it and found the shrapnel had gone into the left chest and the doctor said, ‘I can’t do anything.’ His little tummy just kept heaving until he died.”
The hard question to ask is this: did Colvin’s reports add anything to our understanding of the situation? We were pretty clear about what a lethal siege looks like, even if we hadn’t been from lethal sieges of the past. Colvin could argue that by simply being there, she was making something happen — her presence in East Timor during the Indonesian attacks was said to have saved the lives of a whole community, though the story is not undisputed — but was that really the purpose of journalism per se? Or had she succumbed to what she herself mused upon last year, the confusion of bravery with bravado, of reporting with war junkiedom?
That suspicion is reinforced by remarks she made, about her continued work after losing the eye in Sri Lanka in 2001: “So, was I stupid? Stupid I would feel writing a column about the dinner party I went to last night … Equally, I’d rather be in that middle ground between a desk job and getting shot, no offence to desk jobs.” Front-line reportage or dinner party gossip, are those really the only alternatives? What about something more interpretive, that explained to readers the roots of the conflict, and the complexities of the situation? Would that not be — desk job though it is — in service to the Syrian people, perhaps more so than reportage, sometimes shading into war p-rn?
The suspicion that something more is going on — as it is with many war correspondents — is reinforced not only by that damn eye patch, a largely superfluous affectation that seemed to emphasise the narcissistic dimension of war reporting — but also by her comparison of Homs with Srebrenice, despite the many differences between the two situations. Having decided that the West should intervene, Colvin was, by her own account, trying to gather stories that would shame the West into acting. She seems to have achieved that with her death, with Nicolas Sarkozy stating: “That’s enough now … This regime must go,” the death of two European journalists apparently capable of tipping any scale you might want to offer.
Thus the whole cause is neatly contained within the Western drama of salvation, and the Syrians themselves become a backdrop in their own country — as in the last photo of her that has now become iconic, and a more telling picture than many war correspondents would want to admit to. Did her death add to our understanding? Or become part of the drama in ways which make clear-sighted action less possible?
The question can be widened to one that is rarely asked, and that is abut not merely the personality, but the class basis of many such journalists. Overwhemingly drawn from a fairly privileged elite –especially in Britain — or ex-forces personnel, their default setting seems to be a cynicism about organisational politics of any type, and a celebration of individual “conscience”, tied in with eye-witness, and often uncontextualised, accounts of suffering. For many such correspondents, trying to understand the meaning of a conflict is what Colvin disparagingly called the “desk job”, a hint of the wilful anti-intellectualism that often pervades war reporting (making all the more visible the quality of the work of those — such as Robert Fisk and John Pilger — who do put in the desk time).
Such journalists’ careers also serve the interests of other journalists, trapped in a profession that is increasingly devolving to rewriting press releases to wrap around advertising on a page of lifestyle features. The exploits — constructive or otherwise — of war correspondents becomes a way of retaining some meaning in a diminished profession, and their deaths consequently become a rallying point for professional self-celebration.
Bravery is a virtue, and Colvin clearly had it in spades, but it’s a virtue of means, not ends — and when attached to a series of agendas that are anything but those of the wider Syrian people, such exploits can have a contrary effect. At a time when an ever larger proportion of war reportage is being done by the people themselves, and then posted/smuggled/emailed to the wider world, there’s all the more reason to cast a critical eye over large organisations such as the BBC, and individual hero correspondents and the narratives they bring to complex struggles.

26 thoughts on “Rundle: Colvin was brave in Syria, but her cause is unjust”
Guy Rundle
February 27, 2012 at 3:51 amTad
The 30,000 figure. You’ve now given two separate sources and three separate rationales for the figure
1) In your Drum article a fortnight ago, you used the figure without sourcing, and repeated that in the intial comment on my article above
1.1) I challenged you on that, suggesting it was an NTC figure, which had been produced by them, without evidence, at the height of the conflict, and that they had used it as an estimate of killing by Gaddafi’s forces.
1.2) In your reply to my reply, you agreed that it was an NTC figure, stating:
“I used that figure of 30,000 precisely because it was the claim made by the NTC health minister.”
(At that point you made no mention of Hugh Roberts in the LRB)
1.3) I suggested to you that it seemed inconsistent to use the figures of the NTC when you describe them as:
“ the NTC regime and its ties (strengthened by the intervention) to far more sinister forces in the West who definitely don’t want to see the early liberatory potential of the revolution to return.”
and that this is especially so when the figure is unverified.
1.4 In your most reent reply, you now say that you sourced the 30,000 figure from the Hugh Roberts article. I’ve now re-read this article twice, and text searched it. I can find no mention of a casualty figure by Roberts. So if there is (and I may have missed it) please point me to it.
1.4.1 The only mention of the 30,000 figure I can find is in the comments/letters string below the article, where a correspondent named David Seddon (supporting Roberts) notes:
“Although definitive figures have yet to be produced, current estimates suggest up to 30,000 dead and 50,000 injured, 20,000 of them seriously.”
Was that the 30,000 figure you were referring to in quoting the Roberts article? Because this too remains unsourced and offers no evidence or provenance – leading one to the suspicion that it is the NTC figure that you claimed to be quoting from, recycled through one more document.
The only concrete figures I can see in the Roberts article occur two thirds of the way through, where he attempts to point out the low casualty figures prior to the beginning of bombing assistance:
“At this point the total death toll since 15 February was 233, according to Human Rights Watch. The Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme suggested between 300 and 400 “
The only other figures Roberts deploys is his explicitly speculative figure at the start of the essay;
“ the combined rebellion/civil war/ Nato bombing campaign to protect civilians has occasioned several thousand (5000? 10,000? 25,000?) deaths, many thousands of injured and hundreds of thousands of displaced persons, as well as massive damage to infrastructure”
In other words, Roberts is making clear that he has no reliable figure for civilian and combatant deaths. Nor does Roberts, in his reply to the letters around the article, take the opportunity to endorse a figure. So where in Roberts’s piece is a ‘detailed argument’ which cites or alludes to the 30,000 figure?
To recap: you’ve changed your claims about the sourcing of the figure, since I challeneged them, but the new source you quote doesn’t mention the 30,000 figure at all. As i say, if ive genuinely missed it in the (long) Roberts piece, point it out, and I’ll look at his argument. In the absence of such, i’ll regard this as bad argument at best, insouciant negligence at worst.
2) the NTC. I don’t understand the point you’re making about the NTC or my view of it. I was simply citing your reply in which you argued that the NTC was a pro-NATO group in alliance with ‘dark forces’ (your term) within the West. I pointed out that to make that allegation, and to then take a casualty figure they had produced unsourced was inconsistent.
As to your other points:
1) the ‘human rights’ situation
Prashad’s useful summary of some reports from Libya doesn’t sway me to see the revolution as a failure.
1.2) potential
I have no idea what the potential is. Your assessment of it seems to me to be an interpretation within a specific Marxist framework I don’t share, and is purely speculative. My belief remains that the Libyan uprising was a genuine popular revolution, that it was in a potentially terminal military emergency once Benghazi was encircled, and that justified advocating military assistance they were requesting.
2) revolution.
You state that you revolutions should give people ‘increased collective control over their own lives’. I’m not so prescriptive. If a revolution is against a lethal state apparatus which has created a sclerotic society, and wants our help [and is not in favour of an equally repressive state, ie an al-qaeda revolution would not be something to support] then i’m happy to advocate that we help them. Beyond the previously stated caveat, I’m not going to base my solidaristic obligations on whether the Libyans agree with my idea of the good life. If they want to fill Tripoli with Starbucks, that’s there business. I’m sufficiently marxisant to think that the entee of full global capitalism into Libya might be a progressive process. Your argument that every revolution should always and everywhere increase collective control strikes me as most un-Marxist.
3) Egypt.
My quoting of various events in Egypt – the electoral rise of the Salafists etc – was simply to argue against the judging of revolutions by their aftermath, during which reversals are possible. You continue to insist that this general example is a particular point. In doing so, you seem to find it necessary to put a very specific interpretation on events:
“in the streets and workplaces there is growing clarity about the limits of the Islamists in taking the revolution forward, and their unwillingness (although contradictory) to take on SCAF. “
Well maybe, but maybe not. It remains an opinion from Sydney about what is happening at the most local level of Egyptian society. You may be right, you may be wrong, but your tone of certainty seems to suggest that you an admit no outcome other than positive for Egypt. My point is that a negative outcome is possible, but that this would not invalidate the revolution per se. Your points give the impression that you need the Egyptian revolution not to go wrong, for it to be legitmate.
As to revolutionary strategic comparisons between Egypt and Libya, I seem them as no use whatsoever. A dense, non-petrodollar, metropolitan state with a major city of 10+ million has very little useful comparison in that respect to an oil rich desert coastal strip which has functioned as a closed society for decades. The Egyptian demonstrators had a strength in numbers and massing which the Libyans couldn’t match, and Gaddafi deployed lethal strategies which Mubarak didn’t. I remain sceptical of revolutionaries who believe that every uprising will be accomplished without a period of war, and that this war might be undertaken by a numerical minority.
4)solidarity. There was no question that the mass of people taking up arms in Libya wanted armed assistance, and were unconcerned that former colonial powers were providing it. Even the most sceptical reports quoted fighters as saying this. Therefore, mine and others advocacy of that was in support of them, whether their decision to call for that will ultimately prove wise or not. Your suggestion that it was really solidarity with NATO is inherently an interpretation of some essence behind the appearance. The solidarity in this case was to make it clear that many of us did not regard the anti-intervention position regarding Iraq and elsewhere as applying in this case. The purpose of that was to make it clear that there was no large anti-western involvement movement, and in that we were successful – not least in sowing doubt among a number of people aligned or identifying with internationalist left groups. Maybe it was a small or miniscule contribution, but you don’t get to choose that.
AR
February 27, 2012 at 10:27 amAndyB – although Syria has little oil of its own (like Jordan – the West’s favourite sheltered dictatorship) but derived sizeable income from the pipelines channelling Iraqi oil to the Med coastline for the French companies.
The other main reason why the West is luke warm on regime change is that, with the US satrap in Egypt gone, Syria (despite?because of the Iranian connection) is the only half sane arab state left in the region. They don’t even demand return of the Golan heights (except for obligatory rote) which suits Israel just fine.
Kevin Herbert
February 27, 2012 at 11:11 amSTRATEBREAKS:
Colvin’s reporting will sink into the mists of time, although I notice that FOX News is already deifying her memory becuase……she was stupid enough to stay when all other reasonable reporters had left?..or becuase she was a woman jouno who stayed longer than the men?..or whatever…
ANDYB: your supposition re Syria’s oil reserves in support of your criticism of Rundler’s rationale, is a non sequitor.
It’s like saying ” If I were 4 metres tall, I wouldn’t be afraid of you”.
Dr_Tad
February 27, 2012 at 8:54 pmGuy, entirely my bad regarding the Roberts attribution. I had erroneously recalled the 30,000 figure from the article and because of its length used the “find” function & “30,000” when I quickly rechecked it for the Drum article. It is indeed from a letter by David Seddon and I merely repeated that error this time. Thanks for spotting and correcting my “insouciant negligence”.
I initially deployed the casualty figures (and I’m happy to take the lower Wikipedia estimate) and length of the campaign to point to the oddness of your claim that Gaddafi had such a limited social base. But it’s no use talking to you about Gaddafi’s social base (or the NTC’s relative weakness of social base) because when one raises empirical markers like this all I get back are assertions based on little (or no) empirical support. Suddenly having a few “mercenaries and weapons” allows a dictator to hold off months of armed rebellion and NATO bombing.
On the other 4 points:
(1) I’m not asking you to adjudge the Libyan revolution as failure or not. Not sure why you think this is my argument. This is a more important argument about whether its initial clearly liberatory character has suffered setbacks as a result of the pro-NATO strategy of its leadership. And it’s not a settled question — which is why I talk about the need for ordinary people to take on the NTC leadership and NATO.
(2) Sorry if this is too Marxist for you, but when Trotsky called revolutions “the forcible entrance of the masses into the realm of their own destiny” I think he was making a useful distinction between revolutions and other types of attack on “a lethal state apparatus which has created a sclerotic society”. Given how much play you (rightly) make of the mass character of the Libyan revolution, it seems weird that you wouldn’t then evaluate its success by the level of collective influence from below. The fact that you think that “the entee [entry?] of full global capitalism into Libya might be a progressive process” strikes me as even weirder, given that Gaddafi was a state capitalist who had spent years cultivating deeper ties with the centres of global capitalism already. This isn’t 1848, you know.
(3) You keep erecting straw people here, Guy. The Egyptian revolution is an unfinished process. Like in Libya there are deep contradictions playing themselves out. It is simply not true that I want to “admit no outcome other than positive for Egypt”, nor is it true that I “need the Egyptian revolution not to go wrong, for it to be legitimate”. None of my disagreement with you is about these things. It is about making a careful judgement, from a Left standpoint (one that sees collective social liberation — you remember that old chestnut — as important and desirable), of the actual social and political character of what has happened. The Egyptian revolution may end up getting deflected/hijacked/crushed. That will not change its legitimacy any more than the hijacking of the Libyan revolution by the NTC and its NATO allies makes it somehow illegitimate.
And the question of war is another non sequitur. It allows you to once again obfuscate the social character of the conflict. It would seem that once your idiosyncratic criterion set for “revolution” is met, all critical thinking about these issues goes out the window.
(4) Which brings me to solidarity. This is the least convincing part of your argument because it rests on simply adjudging that “they” know best. Well, this dodges not only who “they” are (and there is no indication that the rebellion had reached consensus, Australian Greens style, even if the clear majority was convinced by the pro-NATO argument) but far more importantly it subcontracts your political judgement to theirs, once you’ve decided they’re “legitimate”.
This is deeply disappointing coming from one of the most engaged and thoughtful writers on the Australian Left, one who is rightly widely read and justly influential (not to mention a pleasure to co-edit books with!) — and it’s in that spirit that I’ve wanted to continue this debate. Even with my occasional lapses into “insouciant negligence” along the way.
Steve Gardner
February 28, 2012 at 4:51 pmRundle mentions Pilger and Fisk as war reporters who aren’t afraid to ‘put in time at the desk’, meaning, to go beyond eye-witness reporting of horrors from the front lines of battle and lay bare for their readers the roots and complexity of a conflict, and the motivations, strategies and (mis)calculations of the important actors in it. The best journalist in the world by this measure must be Mark Danner. His reporting of the conflicts in Haiti and especially in the Balkans made these baffling conflicts comprehensible — and yet in so doing he intensified rather than lessening their horror.
natascha hryckow
March 3, 2012 at 9:51 pmhttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-17241897