Future Afghan government will include Taliban
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At the recent London conference on Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai declared he would begin negotiations with top leaders of the Taliban, whom he called his “disenchanted brothers”. “We must reach out to all of our countrymen,” he said, “who are not part of al-Qaeda, or other terrorist networks.” Karzai’s proposal has received cautious support from many members of the occupying coalition in Afghanistan. Even the US, which prefers a scheme in which the western coalition pays rank-and-file Taliban fighters to lay down their arms, did not publicly criticise Karzai’s invitation to the Taliban leadership to attend a “grand peace jirga [council]”. “You don’t make peace with your friends,” explained US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. “You have to be willing to engage with your enemies.” Now, it’s by no means clear that the Taliban want to negotiate. After all, they currently seem to be winning. Still, a few days ago, the Guardian reported that Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Afghan Taliban leader himself, was prepared to break with al-Qaeda in return for peace. That claim came from a former Pakistani intelligence officer who had trained Omar during the civil war in the 1990s. Brigadier Sultan Amir Tarar explained: “The moment [Omar] gets control the first target will be the al-Qaeda people. He wants peace in the country, he doesn’t want adventure. He has enough of that.” Furthermore, in December, the Wall Street Journal noted a Taliban communiqué that seemed to promise that the group would forswear al-Qaeda in return for the withdrawal of foreign troops. These hints at a schism between the pan-Islamist terror group al-Qaeda and the Pashtun-based Taliban make Karzai’s negotiations seem far more plausible. Imagine, for instance, if Mullah Omar handed Osama bin Laden over to the international community! What a breakthrough that would be! Well, here’s the thing: the Taliban offered precisely that. Nine years ago. In 2001, before the ground invasion began, the Taliban deputy prime minister, Haji Abdul Kabir, proposed to give up bin Laden. He made only three conditions: the bombing would have to stop, the US would need to show evidence of bin Laden’s responsibility for the September 11 attacks, and bin Laden would have to receive a trial in a third country. How serious was the offer? According to the Washington Post, before 9/11 the Taliban had met with US officials more than 20 times, repeatedly suggesting they would hand over bin Laden. After 9/11, the Taliban leaders were, Jeremy R. Hammond at the Foreign Policy Journal suggests, furious at the al-Qaeda leader for what they saw as his adventurism. But the US rejected talks out of hand. A few days later, the Taliban repeated the proposal — and this time dropped the demand for evidence. Once more, Bush refused. At the time, the US reaction generated very little comment. After all, those were days in which the Afghan mission was presented as part of a clash of civilisations, extending far beyond bin Laden. The overthrow of the Taliban was, it was said, necessary to liberate women, to protect human rights, to restore democracy. One could not negotiate with such people. Today, however, that’s all changed. These days, when it comes to women, the warlords of the Karzai regime and the warlords of Mullah Omar seem increasingly similar. Last year, for instance, Karzai himself backed a law that criminalised married women refusing s-x to their husbands, and banned them from leaving the house, seeking work, schooling or visiting doctor without their husbands’ permission. The human rights situation remains uniformly grim, with the Afghan security forces routinely torturing detainees, and Karzai running in the last election alongside Mohamed Fahim, a man accused by Amnesty International of some of the worst abuses in the country. As for democracy, again, Karzai set the tone. His own electoral legitimacy rests on a 2009 poll, which he won only through ballot stuffing, voter intimidation and other (well-documented) chicanery. It’s true that the negotiations proposed in London were predicated on Taliban acceptance of the Afghan constitution. Yet few people realise that that document, cobbled together by Karzai’s warlord allies, declares Afghanistan to be “an Islamic Republic” and states that “no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam”. Could the Taliban accept such a constitution? It’s hard to see why they couldn’t. As Winston Churchill said, to jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war, especially in Afghanistan where the people have endured decades of continuous conflict. But it’s odd there hasn’t been more discussion of how, nine years into the occupation, we’re countenancing negotiations on terms significantly worse than those offered before the war actually began. That is, in 2001, a deal with the Taliban would have meant accepting a repressive and authoritarian government in return for the capture of bin Laden. Negotiations at that point would have spared tens of thousands of lives, and saved the $172 billion the war is currently estimated to have cost. Had that extraordinary amount of money gone to, say, alleviate Afghan poverty and promote development rather than funding an occupation, it might even have spurred a civil society capable of challenging the Taliban from within. Instead, however, bin Laden’s still free and Afghanistan remains as impoverished and miserable as ever, even as we accept (in fact, fund) a repressive and authoritarian government in the form of Karzai and his gang. And now the Taliban, whether by negotiation or military success, seem almost certain to play some role in a future Afghan government. So nine years of bloodshed and death, and billions upon billions of dollars spent. What was it all for? |
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12 Comments
Indeed, nine years to re-establish the certainty that there is a place for women and women know their place. Almost time to return.
Once again, I am convinced that the cost of the military establishment is excessive. The existence of this huge industry in its present form is outrageous, given that its purpose is in no way humanitarian.
I hope for a future where funds for good works are greater than funds for the amoral use of force to obtain nationalistic objectives.
For example, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has committed billions of dollars to the eradication of polio, for malaria prevention and zilch for arms. If only half of the trillions spent internationally on warmaking could be similarly directed… … just wishing.
American interference in Afghanistan’s affairs did not begin post 9/11. In the late 1970s a systematic program was carried out which included a policy of creating conditions that would cause the Soviet Union to intervene in support of the nationalist government then in power in Kabul. That duly happened giving the USSR what Brzezinski gleefully called “its own Vietnam”. For years thereafter the Americans trained and supported the mujihideen (including one Osama bin Laden) to wage a guerilla war in Afghanistan. After the Russians withdrew there was a period of instabilit and civil war eventually ended by the Taliban coming to power. The Americans had no problems then with a Taliban government, in fact paying the wages of senior government officials.
It was only when, in June 2001, the Taliban government refused the American’s demands with respect to the pipeline to bring oil and gas from the rich Caspian fields, did relations sour. Bush then signed the executive order for the bombing of Afghanistan to commence in October. The plans had been in place for many months before that.
The events of 11 September 2001 provided the Americans with the excuse, but it was not the reason for the invasion. As Mr Sparrow points out, the Taliban agreed to hand bin Laden over to an international tribunal if the americans could produce evidence that bin Laden was in fact responsible for 9/11 (something the man himself vehemently denied before his probable death in December 2001),
The Americans refused to produce that evidence. I suggest for two reasons. First, they did not and indeed could not produce such evidence because there is none. Secondly, they intended to invade anyway because they had their eyes on the huge energy prize of the “stans” to the north. It is not a coincidence that they have since built four huge bases which are placed to protect the pipeline route. That fact also suggests that they are not intending to leave anytime soon.
Even if bin Laden had been responsible for 9/11 the American (and Australian) invasion and occupation would still be illegal under international law. That inconvenient fact is notably missing from the Australian media’s discussions on Afghanistan, as is any sense of history.
As a result of this blind adherence to America’s imperial follies Australia is endangered in a way they never should be. In this Rudd is now just as culpable as Howard, although as the notion of accountability for war crimes has disappeared from our vocabulary don’t expect any change soon.
@ J.O’Neill
You say many intriguingly unfamiliar things which one might like to follow up if your credibility was not sullied by your saying “Even if bin Laden had been responsible for 9/11 the American (and Australian) invasion and occupation would still be illegal under international law” without referring to Security Council Resolution 1386 unanimously passed on December 20, 2001.
What else should we be wary about in what you say?
The Americans haven’t come up with any proof over Bin Laden’s involvment because there probably isn’t any. They, not Bin Laden , are the most dangerous people on this planet. Never lose sight of that fact
Julius - if you find any of JO’N’s exposition “..intriguingly unfamiliar..” then you haven’t been paying attention.
@ AR
Excuse my euphemistic way of referring to matters which need more than J O’Ns assertions to make me believe them and on which I was hoping to enlist his presumed capacity to back up his assertions by a little flattery.
I am actually unfamiliar with convincing evidence that
(a) Osama bin Laden dies in December 2001 or at all,
(b) that he ever denied responsibility for 9/11 rather than gloried in it and took credit for it (though my recollections of the evidence for that, i.e his taking credit, would only be bits and pieces of casually acquired info. If the videos apparently featuring him are genuine however he clearly does not repudiate any of the terrorist attacks). Of course he did have reason to deny his guilt while there was still some question of his being handed over to the US,
(c) the US invasion of Afghanistan was decided in effect before 9/11 or that it was to secure the route of an oil pipeline, not that it is an absurd hypothesis to examine in the light of the history of great powers, not least the US,
(d) none of the NATO countries or even the permanent members of the Security Council knew, or if they knew, cared about this nefarious US plotting to invaded Afghanistan anyway…
What does JO’Neill make of all those videos apparently showing O b L and made in recent years? Clearly the CIA has not decided that he is dead unless you can see them behaving like, well, climate scientists who will say what it takes to keep up the budget and stay in business.
I would add for completeness my view of the Australian government’s involvement in Bush’s follies. My view can be best made in relation to the Iraq war, whose legality or illegality seems to me of minor importance given the absence of reliably judiciary or police force for international law. It was an unnecessary, ruinously expensive folly for the US to invade Iraq. For Australia however, which probably would have gone in with the US if Simon Crean or Kim Beasley had been PM, it was a decision to make sure the US felt at least mildly obliged to treat us as a protected favoured ally over the long period in which the US would still be the most powerful nation on earth. Given that we lost only one soldier, who shot himself, in Iraq it stands up as a pretty good investment. Afghanistan is an a fortiori case as long as we don’t do more than we have to.
I see no evidence that our involvement in those US wars has, apart from the financial cost - which is probably less than our bad decisions about submarines and replacement aircraft - resulted in a net cost to us. There is some slight evidence, of slight evidentiary value, on each side including the increased weight we have enjoyed in some parts of Asia as a close US ally, a diminishing asset no doubt.
Julius,
My view that the war is illegal in international law is hardly original and is widely held by many legal scholars.
The UN resolution to which you refer did not authorise the war: it condemned terrorism and called on states to do what was necessary to combat it. This is far short of approval by the Security Council as required by the Charter. To wage war and not fall foul of it being the “supreme crime” (as defined at Nuremburg) the act of war must fall within Article 51. There is not the space to discuss this in detail: suffice to say that the acts of the US (and its allies including Australia) do not meet any of the requirements of Article 51.
As to the rest of my argument? Well, as AR says, you haven’t been paying attention. Every proposition I advanced is founded on solid empirical evidence. The fact that it is not found in Australia’s mainstream media tells one more about the quality of journalism in this country than anything else.
If you are seriously interested in knowing more, read Fitzgerald & Gould “Afghanistan’s Untold Story” and Peter Dale Scott “The Road to 9/11”.
@J.’O’Neill
Thanks for that information. I shall tag the email of your post in the hope that I can get around to following up on those two books which I shall now Google for to see what the reviews say and try and work out why my extensive reading from Foreign Affairs to NYRB to Spectator to Atlantic to you-name-it from time to time has not left a solid deposit of doubt about what the Afghan invasion was really about. In April 2002 I spent a lot of time in New York with New Yorkers from investment bankers to a former director of the Socialist International (yes an American!) all of whom would have agreed on one thing: Bush was appalling. But I didn’t hear a breath of a suggestion about any of the oil pipeline theory of what the war was about.
I note from following the links in Jeff Sparrow’s article that it could fairly be said that there was a professional State Department rather than Cheney view that the Taliban government was probably only playing for time and never going to give up bin Laden. Great Powers have to teach people that they can’t stuff them round or they don’t remain Great Powers. Some of the very recent stuff on North Korea’s bizarre racist nationalist inward looking ideology and its playing for time gives credence to that view of the Taliban being a reasonable one.
Why do you think O b L is dead and what do you make of his more recent videos and and recordings as they appear to be?
A glimpse of Peter Dale Scott’s book by browsing the web keeps on my reading list for some time.
But a side note to those most likely to accept it instinctively as the truth, it looks to me very like Monckton on AGW. A hardworking very able and peristent person applies himself to mastering the official case and the facts and threads which might lead one to form a different view. Scott being close to Chomsky doesn’t make him prima facie correct on matters touching US foreign policy in my eyes but it doesn’t stop me trying to evaluate what he has to say and the weight and reliability of his evidence. I would like to think those that find his conclusions wholly and immediately congenial might stretch their intellects and imaginations to some comparable efforts which are less congenial to them, of which I don’t hesitate to mention Monckton’s work because the practical consequences of his being right are far more important to Australians that whether Scott is right in his history and analysis.
Julius,
Your comment at 9.55pm had not appeared when I wrote my response to your earlier comment.
There is a vast literature on the points that I raised. The two books that I referenced are among the better ones for giving an accurate historical overview and insight into why present policies are being pursued. Ironically, some of the best sources for the pipeline argument come from official American documents themselves, including intelligence assessments. I would also argue that one is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from proven facts, and the facts relating to such things as oil and gas policy; the actions of the oil majors; the location of US military bases in Afghanistan etc are plain to see.
I didn’t even mention the drug connections, but again it is an historic fact that US military interventions in key areas of the world are always acompanied by radical changes in the pattern of drug trafficking. Again, Scott is a useful source as he has written extensively on this topic, but see also Alfred McCoy “The Politics of Heroin.”
As to Osama bin Laden being dead or alive? Again it is an inference drawn on the preponderance of probabilities. One writer in the American Conservative magazine referred to him as Osama bin Elvis on the grounds that there was actually more evidence that Elvis was still alive than there was for a similar conclusion about OBL.
The best summary of the evidence can be found in David Ray Griffin’s book “Osama bin Laden: Dead or Alive”.
There is also a growing volume of evidence about the authenticity, or more accurately lack thereof, of the OBL video and audio tapes. If in fact OBL died on or about 16 December 2001, as the evidence suggests, it raises some very interesting questions about the source of the later videos. Cui bono? Always a useful question.
@ J.O’Neill
Thank you again. I wish I had time to follow up properly. At least I shall have something to stir friends and correspondents with in the meantime. Indeed I would like to see John Clarke do a job like “The Games” on a CIA like organisation trying to follow up on their bloated bureaucratic incompetence after 9/11. The scene where they discuss whether to keep O b L alive as a virtual character and someone says “What do we do if he turns up?” could be quite fun to write. (Applying your cui bono question does bring in the CIA and other Western agencies if only because they have notably not rubbished the genuineness of the later videos. Not that I would wish to scorn the immense intelligence, knowledge and ingenuity I am sure is to be found in US Intelligence agencies).
I must try this out on a Republican friend who used to know most of the leading neo-cons when he lived on the East coast but, from about 2001 started roundly to call them traitors. (That they were fellow Jews made not the slightest difference to him except perhaps to add an extra touch of outrage to his reaction). I wouldn’t call him a palaeo-conservative BTW. Nor another one who, without inside knowledge or contacts, came to the objective conclusion that the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was bombed, or struck by rockets, deliberately….. In order to help orient myself toward relatively unfamiliar or unlikely possibilities that I haven’t previouslyconsidered in depth it would be helpful to find a good study of past historical obscurities which have finally been clarified or exposed many years later and to get some idea of how long important secrets can be kept from public knowledge. Obviously it would be biased by not being able to deal with secrets which have remained secret. However, it would be interesting to analyse what tends to help secrets to remain secret and what exposes them eventually.
Clearly modern communications, egalitarianism, and the money to be made by publication, without counting political advantage or conscience, should mean that there is less likelihood of important organised lies and concealments remaining unexposed for more than about 30 years.