Howard and Kelly rewrite history on East Timor
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It is hardly novel that a politician looking back at the glory days of office will want to ensure that their political legacy looks as positive as possible. And for whatever faults one might find with John Howard’s period as prime minister, he was a politically-successful prime minister. One wonders, then, why Howard finds it necessary to create a palpable fiction over his commitment to East Timor’s independence, which he claimed was both inevitable and that he would go along with it. Similarly, one wonders why a journalist of Paul Kelly’s stature would participate in the peddling of the fiction that “the Howard government decided in early 1999 to work for East Timor’s independence”, given evidence to the opposite is both overwhelming and freely available. Howard’s claim is contained in Paul Kelly’s book The March of Patriots — the Struggle for Modern Australia, the subject of a self-authored puff piece in The Weekend Australian. In short, Howard not only did not “work for east Timor’s independence”. In fact, both his words and actions were contrary to this outcome. By late 1998, Indonesia had already been involved in discussions with Portugal and the UN about moving towards some sort of resolution to the East Timor issue, and the Indonesian army had begun forming its anti-independence militias from that time. Howard’s letter to Indonesia’s President Habibie in December 1998 suggesting a protracted process of resolution was intended to ensure that Australia was no longer seen to be unquestioningly endorsing East Timor’s incorporation into Indonesia at a time when Indonesia’s no longer held such a view. Howard’s foreign minister, Alexander Downer, publically accepted Indonesia’s patently false denials about the militias, despite intelligence briefs to the contrary. In a discussion between DFAT secretary Ashton Calvert and senior US envoy Stanley Roth, Roth said that a full-scale peace-keeping operation in East Timor was necessary. Calvert, acting on government orders, refused. Roth later said Australia’s policy of keeping the peace-keeping option at “arms length was essentially defeatist”. Howard also opposed having official Australian observers to the ballot, and only accepted the need for a small parliamentary delegation at the last moment, and after the creation of a politically independent Australian NGO observer group. Australian Defence Forces were similarly told not to prepare for involvement in East Timor, including no logistic support for the ballot or to send military observers. It did, however, plan to extract Australian civilians if and when the situation deteriorated. Yet just two weeks ahead of the ballot, Downer told Australian observers in the courtyard of Dili’s Resende Inn that they should not expect assistance if the security situation deteriorated further. The message was clear: do not stay. That was the same message being sent at that time by the militias, who wanted not witnesses to their carnage. At this time, the Australian government was acting against — and denying the content of — a flood if since leaked intelligence showing the Indonesian army was working to derail the ballot. The Howard government’s position on East Timor was, in public that it should remain as part of Indonesia, and in private that it would do nothing to hinder that outcome. In that Australia sent an intervention force, the Howard government did not even give the order to prepare until 7 September — more than a week after the ballot, and the force was immediately faced with equipment shortfalls due to this lack of planning. Ultimately Australia was pushed into leading INTERFET by the US, which acted as guarantor for Indonesia’s acquiescence. To suggest that, as Howard has done, that he secretly supported East Timor’s independence can only be understood as true if such a secret was not only kept from the public, but also government ministers, the most senior government officials and the Australian Defence Force that was ultimately required to cobble together an intervention capacity. Australia’s intervention in East Timor was a great achievement, if too late to stop a slaughter. But it followed the outrage of the Australian people, not some “secret” agenda of the then prime minister. Associate Professor Damien Kingsbury from Deakin University is author of ‘East Timor: The Price of Freedom’ (Palgrave 2009). |
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10 Comments
Look forward to Paul Kelly’s reply
Obviously a rushed article by Kingsbury- the grammar is quite poor and the typos innumerable. What a pity! If this is indicative of Kingsbury’s other works then I might pass thanks!
Tks Damien this has been getting up my nose since Saturday. It is arrant nonsense. Someone elsewhere reminded me of The Bulletin cover “Howard blood on his hands” and the fact that the after the Bulletin ran the story about how much the Government knew abt the Militias activities, the AFP raided the journo’s house to find the leaker. LaurieBrereton also led the charge in Fed Parliament about Howard and Downer’s activities.
It was unforgiveable sending those coppers in unarmed as monitors and the people in the UN compound in Dili would have been massacred if Australian public hadn’t forced Howard to act. And let’s not forget the activities of Downer after the Intefret intervention of trying to steal the oil away from the fledgling nation.
You would have thought that if Fearless Leader Howard and Great Diplomat Downer had been the architects of East Timor’s independence they would have been invited for the 10th Anniversary celebrations. Quite pointedly, they were not
Having read this article I can only empathise with the West Papuans who have a snowflake in hell’s chance of ever getting their country back from the illegal occupiers. With perfidious Australia involved and it’s craven attitude towards Indonesia they can only despair of ever having independence.
Kinsbury is probably right. Howard would have known exactly what the Indons were planning. Our Defence Signals Directorate had and has the capability to intercept nearly every telephone call, email and telex message sent across Indonesia, so the Australian governemnt would have been fully aware of the true situation. Howard and Downer panicked at the last moment when their duplicitous actions came undone and they decided to intervene militarily. The ADF were quite unprepared (not their fault) and it was a close run thing. If the TNI had decided to resist our occupation, it would have been quite bloody. Alex
Good work Damien. The puff piece is stenography masquerading as journalism. Heavy reliance on their current claims, no reliance on leaked materials showing what the actual position was, and avoidance of pretty much every other issue such as the suicide of Merv Jenkins (Kelly’s account can’t explain it), the Roth-Calvert meeting (ditto), Labor’s policy change (same), etc. I might read the book and its footnotes in order to see what proportion of them are based on the protagonists’ own claims.
Here’s my take on the road to InterFET:
http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePages/vol4no3Fernandes.html
As usual with the Rodent & Bunter, the only question is whether they were core, or non-core, lies.
Thank God for your article Damien. That front page nonesense on The Australian absolutely turned my stomach … me thinks perhaps it’s time Mr Kelly learn from Howard’s failure to choose his own departure ? What extraodinary fiction. They say winners write history, so let the East Timorese document what they really think of our successive governments’ complicit role in those long brutal 24 years. And Howard and Downer’s absolute failure during their many prior years in parliament to so much as utter a word in support of East Timorese aspirations.
My recollection of that period (1998-99) is that they limped to line most reluctantly, kicking and screaming, only after events changed on the Indonesian side and only as a result of overwhelming public outcry by fair-minded Australians.
As Damien accurately states, the populist Howard government had no option in the end and then moved strategically to capitalise and transform the event into a major coup for his government. And now, 10 years on we have this disgraceful attempt to completely rewrite history.
The only truth I know from this whole sordid affair - including Downer’s bullying and grubby attempts to steal the devastated third world country’s oil & gas reserves - is that the events of a decade ago were a victory for the East Timorese people, and a victory for the descency of Australians. It was a truly proud moment, cathartic, and I’m glad I lived to see it. Long live the Timorese people! And long live that better side of our character, the qualities that make this country truly great!
Once a lying rat, always a lying rat. Thanks Damien. Howard never had another other intention but to remain uninvolved…until public opinion rose….and he’d have known all along what was starting to mount….if he didn’t, he should have. He did, and he chose to be a Weapon of Mass Avoidance. Look at how many people were slaughtered because of his avoidance. I know, I saw, I was in a uniform there.