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	<title>Comments on: Pearse: Ingredients for another failed response</title>
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		<title>By: Venise Alstergren</title>
		<link>http://www.crikey.com.au/2008/07/04/pearse-ingredients-for-another-failed-response/#comment-15314</link>
		<dc:creator>Venise Alstergren</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 1970 10:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Let us not fall into the well-known dictate of pointing out where Garnaut might not be completely right. Enough of this type of bickering and we will end up like John Howard&#039;s way to screw the Republic issue. Everyone was so determined to have a Republic on THEIR terms, or NOT AT ALL. And guess what happened? Precisely! Let&#039;s get started on this life or death issue, we can fine tune it all later.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Let us not fall into the well-known dictate of pointing out where Garnaut might not be completely right. Enough of this type of bickering and we will end up like John Howard&#8217;s way to screw the Republic issue. Everyone was so determined to have a Republic on THEIR terms, or NOT AT ALL. And guess what happened? Precisely! Let&#8217;s get started on this life or death issue, we can fine tune it all later.</p>
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		<title>By: Jim</title>
		<link>http://www.crikey.com.au/2008/07/04/pearse-ingredients-for-another-failed-response/#comment-15315</link>
		<dc:creator>Jim</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 01 Jan 1970 10:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Couldn&#039;t agree more that Australia (along with other economically developed high emitters) should not wait for others to act, but I didn&#039;t get that message from Garnaut&#039;s presentation: he referred to the prisoners&#039; dilemma that waiting created.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Couldn&#039;t agree less on the rainforest protection issue.  There is no question that offshore avoided deforestation can only be a stopgap measure for Australia while more direct emission reduction strategies are put in place, and in any event, it would not be appropriate to pay a given country (like Indonesia) to hold its deforestation rate below a certain target figure forever - at some point, this becomes the environmentally and economically right thing for the country to do on its own.  Moreover, it is true that putting a lot of short term, limited area privately funded avoided deforestation projects into place might indeed be dubious:   for avoided deforestation to be real, it needs to be designed, applied and monitored at national scale. &lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;However, despite these caveats, paying for genuine deforestation reduction as a form of carbon emissons trading would allow hard targets on net reductions to be introduced to Australia&#039;s high emitting industries earlier, because it is potentially a very cost effective way to get such reductions in place. In the process. it  would also do no harm to Australia&#039;s relationships with its neighbours.  Smart emitters would use the opportunity presented by avoided deforestation to meet their emission reduction targets in the short term, while they built their own direct long term responses. Stupid ones might try to use these trades as a permanent response, but would eventually find themselves in a supply-constrained and rather expensive market, as the international credibility of avoided deforestation programs (and therefore the risk-adjusted price of the trades) rise. </description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Couldn&#8217;t agree more that Australia (along with other economically developed high emitters) should not wait for others to act, but I didn&#8217;t get that message from Garnaut&#8217;s presentation: he referred to the prisoners&#8217; dilemma that waiting created.</p>
<p>Couldn&#8217;t agree less on the rainforest protection issue.  There is no question that offshore avoided deforestation can only be a stopgap measure for Australia while more direct emission reduction strategies are put in place, and in any event, it would not be appropriate to pay a given country (like Indonesia) to hold its deforestation rate below a certain target figure forever - at some point, this becomes the environmentally and economically right thing for the country to do on its own.  Moreover, it is true that putting a lot of short term, limited area privately funded avoided deforestation projects into place might indeed be dubious:   for avoided deforestation to be real, it needs to be designed, applied and monitored at national scale. </p>
<p>However, despite these caveats, paying for genuine deforestation reduction as a form of carbon emissons trading would allow hard targets on net reductions to be introduced to Australia&#8217;s high emitting industries earlier, because it is potentially a very cost effective way to get such reductions in place. In the process. it  would also do no harm to Australia&#8217;s relationships with its neighbours.  Smart emitters would use the opportunity presented by avoided deforestation to meet their emission reduction targets in the short term, while they built their own direct long term responses. Stupid ones might try to use these trades as a permanent response, but would eventually find themselves in a supply-constrained and rather expensive market, as the international credibility of avoided deforestation programs (and therefore the risk-adjusted price of the trades) rise.</p>
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